Winding safety devices.

[Wheldale]

Has anyone got a complete list of winding safety devices? I remember on the Goldmines there were 13 safety devices located on the winder, in the winding house and in the shaft and on the cage. No doubt in the UK there will be similar devices. I cant remember all of them?

I remember the following

3 turns warning device
Overspeed lilly
Slack rope detector
Overwind detector - Tarzan wire - in headgear to detect overwind
Detaching hook
Jack catches to stop cage falling down the shaft after detaching hook releases cage.
Shaft signalling - linked to brakes on winding engine.

Can anyone remember any more?

[John]

The "Lilley Controller"
Detaching hook.
Of course a few jack catches should the detaching hook fail to hold the cage after detaching.
That's all thats needed on a conventional drum winder.

Next is Multi Rope Friction Winder, ie Koepe.

Just guesses here!!
Lilley Controller
Some sort of sensing gear to trip the power off the winder and apply the brakes, magnetic proximity switches, or snaplock switches.
As there is no means of detaching in a Koepe setup, the other two are vital.

I'd hazard a guess the Banksman on seeing the cage wizz passed him would run like hell!!!

BUT, usually a cage/skip entering a dangerous overwind would be going faster than normal, so the "slow banking" devices would knock power off the winder.

[John]

I should also mention, the driver does have a "dead man" switch" for when he's manriding, and an emergency button, which drops the main circuit breaks off in an emergency.

Check this paper out, South Africa I know, but loads of info.
researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/10204/1802/1/gap638-1.pdf

[John]

Should read Lilly Controllers, forgive the error..
'
Here's a good picture of one.

[Wheldale]

When I did my onsetter training years ago in SA. They had a thing called the 3 turns warning device. Basically when there were 3 turns of the winding drum left (if the winder decided to do nothing) an alarm would sound and the breaks would automatically apply. Sounds like the slow banking device you mentioned John.

[John]

That's the slack rope device. The slow banking is on the Lilly Controller usually. When the cage/skip is getting close to bank/bottom, if the winder is going too fast it will trip the winder, we are talking in manual control. In auto, as in mineral skipping, the winder starts slowing down within a "set distance" of loading/tipping levels, if it doesn't, slow banking takes over and again trips power to the winder.

My experience with winding, from observation due to my job, initial wind in minerals, was done manually, if everything worked OK, the engineman switched to auto, and all signalling and winding was taken over by the "electrical settings" ie Lilly controller information and electronic sensors and shaft proximity switches. Which at Boulby were magnetic switches in the tower, and the same at loading level, three in all. Magnet blocks were bolted to the side of the skips to operate this shaft switches.
To understand how they "fit in" one has to watch the operation as a skip comes into line etc. It's not complicated, just basic sequence switching.

I have a fault finding checklist somewhere for Cotgrave Colliery winders. Eventually I'll publish it on the "Sister" website to this site.

Many years back at Markham Main Colliery in Derbyshire, I think that was the one, there was a dangerous overwind. Top cage was detached and the capel demolished the front of the winding engine house. Bottom cage was full, last of the dayshift. A few deaths and many serious injuries. The bottom cage was crushed under the weight of the winding rope paying off the winding drum.

Cause?? Metal fatigue in the braking system, the driver did all he could within his power. But with no brakes!! Since that accident, dual braking was introduced, and what was the NCB brought in better testing procedures. Nobody was to blame, it was just something unforeseen.
I'd still have hated being suspended by the "detaching bellhousing" or worse, sumped!

[Wheldale]

In SA, the slack rope device is a piece of wire suspended accross the rope opening in the engine house. If the cage stuck in the shaft the idea was the rope would go slack, pull on the wire and trip the winder. Of course this wouldn't work if the cage was deep enough that the weight of the rope in the shaft kept the rope tight in the winding house.

When I worked at West Drie, 3 miners were killed when a cage was overwound into the sump. They managed to escape the cage but as the driver reveresed the cage they were crushed in the sump. A tragic accident.

[dazbt]

"Many years back at Markham Main Colliery in Derbyshire, I think that was the one, there was a dangerous overwind. Top cage was detached and the capel demolished the front of the winding engine house. Bottom cage was full, last of the dayshift. A few deaths and many serious injuries. The bottom cage was crushed under the weight of the winding rope paying off the winding drum.

Cause?? Metal fatigue in the braking system, the driver did all he could within his power. But with no brakes!! Since that accident, dual braking was introduced, and what was the NCB brought in better testing procedures. Nobody was to blame, it was just something unforeseen."

Maybe not that many years ago, certainly there were more than a few deaths and even worse, ........... maybe it wasn't (or perhaps shouldn't) have been totally unforseeable.

dmm2.org.uk/uknames/5557-01.htm

[John]

Still a long time ago Daz, I was working at Boulby when that happened and we assured it couldn't happen with either winder there as we had a different braking arrangement.
Just looking at that report in your link. I'll comment later.

[John]

Right, from what I gather from the report was there were a couple of laxes of judgement, WHICH, shouldn't have happened. Namely the "torsion rod" wasn't examined as closely as it should have been. A grub screw was loose, I presume, on the Lilly controller, that was lax maintenance!!
But the major problem was a design flaw.
We all miss things when we make statutory examinations, I for one must have missed hundreds of things, especially on nightshifts. Luckily no one suffered through my errors.
I, like many others paid stricter attention to items where men's lives depended on what I examined. But that doesn't exonerate me from missing items I did miss.
I personally did check the tightness of all bolts on FLP equipment, and did "feel" the gaps. I made it a practice to random check gaps on my "walk arounds" each day. But that's me, not everyone did that. I carried a "sash brush" and used it to prove I'd been around my equipment, again, how many others did that?? I know I was in the minority.
But, I can honestly say, nobody was injured or worse, lost their life through any laxes of my judgement, thank God.

[dazbt]

Feb 26, 2010 17:02:55 GMT -5 John said:

Right, from what I gather from the report was there were a couple of laxes of judgement, WHICH, shouldn't have happened. Namely the "torsion rod" wasn't examined as closely as it should have been. A grub screw was loose, I presume, on the Lilly controller, that was lax maintenance!!
But the major problem was a design flaw.
We all miss things when we make statutory examinations, I for one must have missed hundreds of things, especially on nightshifts. Luckily no one suffered through my errors.
I, like many others paid stricter attention to items where men's lives depended on what I examined. But that doesn't exonerate me from missing items I did miss.
I personally did check the tightness of all bolts on FLP equipment, and did "feel" the gaps. I made it a practice to random check gaps on my "walk arounds" each day. But that's me, not everyone did that. I carried a "sash brush" and used it to prove I'd been around my equipment, again, how many others did that?? I know I was in the minority.
But, I can honestly say, nobody was injured or worse, lost their life through any laxes of my judgement, thank God.

Well …………. you may well be right John, but I remember this tragedy as though it was only yesterday or possibly a year ago, I was working in the pits around that area at the time, including Markham. The concept of a shaft disaster such as this was a nightmare beyond belief, something that belonged in a previous century or possibly a much lesser developed country’s mining safety abilities, what occurred at Markham certainly wasn’t expected or acceptable within our modern mining awareness. The fact that 18 men were killed made it a major disaster in anyone’s evaluation and 11 men critically or seriously injured adds a great deal more to the horror of it all,
“A few deaths and many serious injuries”
doesn’t quite make the point or relate the true facts.
Again it might well be me that isn’t or hasn’t seen things quite as clearly as I should have, but ………….. your comment that;
“Nobody was to blame, it was just something unforeseen.”
is something that I just can’t accept, it wasn’t unforeseen and it certainly wasn’t unavoidable, people that mattered knew about the potential failure, knew the risks and probably even worse, knew the actions that should have been taken to prevent this tragic disaster.
Quote;
“55. A similar rod in a brake spring nest at Ollerton Colliery broke on 14 January 1961 and it was stated by P. Wood, Head of Shafts and Winding Section for the National Coal Board, that tests on this rod showed that stresses induced by bending were the cause of failure. Following this incident the Divisional Chief Engineer, National Coal Board, issued an instruction that the centre rod in all Briggs spring nests should be examined. This instruction did not give any guidance as to the nature and frequency of examinations required or to the use of non-destructive tests. Records showed that an external examination of the Markham rod was made on 19 February 1961, but probably because of lack of guidance, it appears that the rod was not removed for complete examination at that time or subjected to non-destructive testing at any time during its life.”
I might well have misread the final report and may well have ‘misremembered’ what I thought was disclosed at the time, but I will never accept that the Markham Main Disaster of 1973 was an unavoidable accident.

[John]

To be honest Daz, I'd attribute most of the blame to poor manufacturing design. We all say these things shouldn't happen. so why wasn't "redundancy" built into the braking system during the designing stage???
Full "post" style brakes had been around for a century or more, hydraulics and pneumatic braking for many years too, so what weren't ALL braking systems "re-manufactured to incorporate the best with at least two redundant systems involved.
I don't know what transpired after the inquiry within the boards other pits with similar winders, I'd hazard a guess each Mech Engineer would have been required to look into modifying his pits engines though.

[erichall]

Daz, please get the facts straight. In the first place , the accident happened at No.3 Shaft at MARKHAM colliery. Markham main was in another division.
Also , if you read the report closely, although a grub svrew was loose in the overwind system, and should have been picked up before, this was not a contributory factor. The only factor which had any bearing was the fact that the brake rod in the spring system BROKE, and no amount of safety equipment could then have been used with the exception of POSSIBLY regenerative braking. The rod had been examined but had not been ultra-sonically tested, though it was proved that even ultra-sonic testing could possibly not have shown the crack wich had developed due to metal fatigue. The only method SMRE could find was by magnetic particle testing in a laboratory. The winding engineman did what we all would do in the circumstances, when all else had failed, he used the emergency stop. This meant that the only chance of slowing down the cage would have been by regenerative braking, and even that was only a possibility, and no blame was attached to him..
The only failure was in the design of single path braking, which meant that if a component broke, the brake failed. Apparently there had been a failure in a similar system at Ollerton Colliery in 1961, some 12 years earlier.
Laboratory testing proved that the fault inherent in the design was caused by constant changes in the tensing and flexing in the rod of this design, inherent enough to cause the dreaded metal fatigue
I had myself travelled the very shaft at lunchtime on the Thursday previously, and knew many of the men who were killed and injured personally, and can assure you that the accident was scrupulously carried out by HMI.

[dazbt]

Oct 2, 2010 10:36:33 GMT -5 erichall said:

Daz, please get the facts straight. In the first place , the accident happened at No.3 Shaft at MARKHAM colliery. Markham main was in another division.
Also , if you read the report closely, although a grub svrew was loose in the overwind system, and should have been picked up before, this was not a contributory factor. The only factor which had any bearing was the fact that the brake rod in the spring system BROKE, and no amount of safety equipment could then have been used with the exception of POSSIBLY regenerative braking. The rod had been examined but had not been ultra-sonically tested, though it was proved that even ultra-sonic testing could possibly not have shown the crack wich had developed due to metal fatigue. The only method SMRE could find was by magnetic particle testing in a laboratory. The winding engineman did what we all would do in the circumstances, when all else had failed, he used the emergency stop. This meant that the only chance of slowing down the cage would have been by regenerative braking, and even that was only a possibility, and no blame was attached to him..
The only failure was in the design of single path braking, which meant that if a component broke, the brake failed. Apparently there had been a failure in a similar system at Ollerton Colliery in 1961, some 12 years earlier.
Laboratory testing proved that the fault inherent in the design was caused by constant changes in the tensing and flexing in the rod of this design, inherent enough to cause the dreaded metal fatigue
I had myself travelled the very shaft at lunchtime on the Thursday previously, and knew many of the men who were killed and injured personally, and can assure you that the accident was scrupulously carried out by HMI.

Hello Eric and welcome onboard, I’d like to say just how much I’ve enjoyed reading your posts, refreshing to see the spurt of new blood, so to speak.
I will try in future to comply with your request for me to try and get ‘the facts’ straight, I offer my profound apology for my one Freudian ‘Markham MAIN’ slip, the other times Markham Main appear in my related posts are of course as quotes from others, having worked at both Markham in Derbyshire and Markham Main in Yorkshire I did know the difference and shouldn’t have made the mistake, it could have been worse of course had I further confused the issue by throwing in the third Markham colliery (the one in Wales of course).
I would like to say that I did read the report carefully and will stand by exactly what I posted earlier, my main point being that as a result of the previous failure at Ollerton steps should have been taken at that point to make absolutely sure that there was no possible chance of reoccurrence. I don’t pretend to be clever enough to be able to have determined exactly how from an engineering point of view …… but perhaps either the brake rod component should have been designed out, reengineered to withstand the fatigue forces it was then known to be subjected to, replaced on a regular premise based on a safe fatigue life expectancy or, to be scrutinised under laboratory NDT on a planned schedule component exchange (in much the same way that other winding components were). I have absolutely no knowledge of Ultra Sonic Testing but I was involved to some extent with Magnetic Particle Crack Detection on other engineering aspects of mining machinery, the fact that MPCD was determined as being the only method of possible detection means that the fatigue fractures were superficial, which I would have thought were the most obvious and simplest to detect. Portable MPCD units were available long before 1973.
“and can assure you that the accident was scrupulously carried out by HMI.”I presume that is a Typo rather than a Freudian slip Eric, presuming that you really meant to assure me (although I'm not quite sure why?) that the HMI inquiry into the accident cause was scrupulous, I can assure you that I have no doubt that it was.

[erichall]

Sorry, John, it was a typo and should have read 'accident investgation'. I can assure you that the portable magnetic scanners were not able to be used on this type of rod, or I am sure, knowing the workings of the n.Derbys.Area Engineers, it would have been incluided. I totally agree, however, that the accident SHOULD have been prevented in that, following the previous Ollerton Accident, this type of single brake winder should have been removed from service, and the Markham winder would have been replaced before. As I've stated in a previous report, the only 'good' thing about mining accidents is that lessons are learned and acted upon. The things that we often take for granted, and we were all guilty of it in some form or another, are not always the besst. The classic examples at pits I have known, worked at or visited, include
Markham - Ultra sonic testing of winding gear, refreshing of the accident Emergency Procedures, even improvements to Accident and Emergency Procedures at Chesterfield Royal Hospital.
Creswell 1953 - (in the village next to us) introduction of flameproof conveyor belting, and removal of Cotton-Duck Belting. Introduction of the Self-rescuer country-wide since some men were not killed by the fire, but died on the 'wrong' side of an airgate, literally feet from safety. ovecome by Carbon Monoxide fumes
Knockshinock (forgive spelling) - caused by an inrush of 'material likely to flow when wet' because of the driving towards the surface and approaching too close to boggy ground.

There are many others, and unfortunately cost men lives. The problem is that we all can, and do, say this shouldn't have happened. Unfortunately, its very easy to be wise after the event. After the Markham disaster, which incidently was not the first at what was in general, a very well run and safety concious colliery, far more emphasis was put on Safety, sometimes overly so. The first 'Markham Disaster. was in 1923. Markham was a complex of 3 pits (No.s 1,2 &4) working in different seams and different geographical areas, and the first disaster was in the Blackshale, a notoriously gassy seam, when an explosion occurred. This lead to the introduction of Methane Drainage and the removal of electricity from the tail gates and replacement by Compressed air. When I took over, power to the tail Gate side of the face to power Tail Gate face drive, boring facilities and methane boring rig, was supplied by trailing cable through the face to a set of B & F gate end boxes -a not altogether satisfactory system. By this time in the mid 1970's, ventilation had improved immeasurably, the supply of high voltage electricity and its implimented safety features down the tail gate, were a much better proposition to supplying through a coal face via a trailing cable, but it took much talking, persuasion, and proof to convince a union and workforce that the situation that exsisted in 1923 (before any of the workforce had been born) had been vastly improved in all ways, though they finally came round to a more modern, efficient and in our opinion much safer way of operating. Even then, we encouraged them to take part in all safety measures to the fullest extent.
I spent some 3 years as undermanager in the Blackshale, and ended up with a modern-minded , safety concious workforce, of which I was and still am proud.

[John]

One accident that changed rules, and from what we were told, instigated a world wide standard of colour marking of oil drums Eric. I know we are getting away from Winding, but as we are on about accidents teaching us something and safety improvements came out of it, here it is.
I was leading hand electrician on dogwatch, (nights) at a NSW colliery in Australia, Christmas break was almost upon us and I'd covered the previous break and wanted this Christmas off as we'd bought a fixer upper house.
Covering meant statutory coverage while electricity was on underground and supervisory coverage for those electricians working the Christmas break in the absence of the Engineer.
Underground workings were fed by 11KV from the winch room where all the 11KV oil circuit breakers were mounted on a platform above the main drift dolley car winch.
It was time for their annual maintenance to be carried out, oil change etc..
During the break one shift engineer was usually present for most of the shift to cover for statutory reasons too.
Trevor Winterbottom was the young shift engineer who had to take on stat duties, no leading hand would vollunteer, so he and Brian....last name eludes me at the moment, were working together examining the swithgear.
Bit of insight here, Trevor and Brian had been old schoolmates and were now Brothers In Laws, they married each's Sisters, and were also best mates. The reasons I mentioned that will become clear soon.
After they had drained the oil from one of the OCB's, they went to the oil compound shed, and had a forklift driver pick up what was marked as transformer oil and bring it to the winch room.
By all accounts, after opening the drum, they were suspicious of it's contents and approached the storeman, who checked his records and verified it was transformer oil.
They were still hesitant but carried on with the change out. Completed, Trevor went below to keep an eye on truck alignment while Brian eased the truck back into it's recepticle.
As soon as the pins made contact with the main bus sockets, the "oil" in the tank vaporized and caught fire, Treveor was covered from head to feet in burning super heated oil. The blast was so powerful it blew the roller doors out and some windows out.
Trevor was flown by helicopter to the nearest severe burns unit, in Sydney a couple of hundred miles away where he died, Brian was in severe shock and sustained severe burns, he survived but carried the mental scars of losing his best mate and BIL.
When I returned to work after the break, we were given a talk by the Colliery Electrical Engineer on transformer oil and procedures now adopted and MUST be adhered to at ALL times!!
Transformer oil now had to be checked and signed for in numbered drums, each drum was to be checked by him personally and sampled by him and signed for with drum number and test certificate with HIS signature on the test sheet.
All transformer oil was to be in a colour coded drum that colour is now (at that time, mid 80's) being adopted under Australian Standards Institute, we were also told it was being adopted world wide within a short time.

Could I or would I have made the same mistake as Trevor and Brian? I don't think so, as I'd been around transformer oils a lot during my career and I had a few more years experience than the two of them.
What would I have done??? I'd have trashed the drum with it's contents and found another one that satisfied me it was transformer oil.

Contents of the drum that was marked as Transformer oil was revealed as industrial cleaner!!!!! Mostly water with oil!!
My engineer in charge said this WON'T happen again. We were all saddened by Trevor's loss.
Brian stayed on as an electrician but was taking the Deputies course at the local Tech College at the insistence of his wife. He was never the same carefree joking man he was before the accident.

[erichall]

Colour coding has alwaays been a little controversial since it can and is often overcome. It's a usefl tool but not the be all and end all.
The NCB brought in a system of regular checking of lifting apparatus (Chain blocks, Pul-Lifts etc) They idea was that all such apparatus had to go out of the mine for testing at 3 monthly intervals. In order to facilitate this and to make spot checking easier, it was decided that 4 colours would be used, one for each quarter, a simple and easy way to check. I was visiting one of our development districts one day, where the men were assembling a panzer headrive at the new face entry. The gearbox, no light weight. was being positioned when I arrived, and I noticed that the pul-lifts were an out-of-date colour. 'Jud, those plu-lifts are the wrong colour, they're out of date.' I said. 'What colour should they be?' Jud asked. When being informed that they were yellow and should have been red, Jud turned to me and said, straight-faced, 'Sorry, Gaffer.' at which he went 50 yards down the gate , scrabbled in the muck and duly brought back a set of properly coloured, but I'm sure not tested (though I couldn't prove it), changed the two sets over and said 'That o.k. Gaffer?' I found out later that he had four sets buried, each with a different colour and could , at will, provide a set of 'Duly tested ?' pul-lifts.
As I said to many people over the years, the average Miner, whom people thought could only fill out coal etc., was amongst the most inventive of workers. This was proved by a Workman's Inspector I was accompanying, who stopped in the gate to examine some 'Wheway' load binders.' 'What's the matter?' I said 'Wondering what these can be used for ' was his reply. When told of their proper purpose, he said that he wondered what else they could be used for. 'First thing a collier does if he sees a new piece of equipment, is to think what it can be used for other than its stated purpose.' he replied. Twenty minutes later, on travelling the face, we came across a chock with a bent ram, awaiting replacement, and chained onto the panzer by - you've guessed - a Load Binder. Point taken. i said to the Inspector.

[John]

I'd have to agree where time "stamping" is involved, but oxygen cylinders, welding propane cylinders, steam, high pressure steam, compressed air etc all are now universally colour coded for safety.

As far as lifting equipment is concerned, there's only one safe way to check it out, that's have it returned to stores or a workshop. The ones I've used, pull lifts, chain blocks etc since the late 60's/70s had a steel tag on the chains near the main body with a number stamped on them. That was checked against records kept in the office to make sure it complied with the last check on that piece of equipment.

Even though transformer oil was in approved colour coded drums shortly after the accident I mentioned, my elec engineer still maintained HIS test certificate system as a fail safe safeguard, and we had to rigidly follow it or else!!
He or one of the senior shift engineers labeled each drum with a metal tag with a number, a sample was taken from the drum and tested, a certificate was then issued by the engineer with the tag number, the drum was also marked as a precaution, signed and dated. We wanted no more accidents of that nature.

Getting back to winders, I have broke the rules by riding in the small manriding deck on a full skip, but, it was manriding speed, not full mineral speed.

[holty]

At Thorne Colliery we had Blacks Engineering Controllers which governed Overspeed, Overwind , and slow banking etc. There was also a digital device which came into play shadowing the Blacks mechanical device. This was made by a company called Transmitton. We had slack rope wires in the Drum Rope holes and a Ultimate switch in the Headgear and the last one being the Bell hole where the Capel would detach from the cage in the headgear. It was always a bit exciting when the Quartely Test Engineers came to do break tests etc. They would run the cages round with a weght car on and overide the overspeed device and trip it out in midshaft giving the ropes and brakes one hell of an hammering.