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Post by dazbt on Jan 18, 2013 4:03:56 GMT -5
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Post by John on Jan 18, 2013 12:05:01 GMT -5
That's pretty good news, maybe now word has got around the other mine Superintendents that breaking the law will end up with a prison sentence.
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Post by dazbt on Jan 18, 2013 12:23:50 GMT -5
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Post by tygwyn on Jan 18, 2013 13:08:14 GMT -5
21mths is`nt much for causing 29 deaths.
I wonder what Fyfield and the company will get?
That clown that drove up Snowdon got 22mths jail,where`s the comparison?
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Post by John on Jan 18, 2013 13:21:36 GMT -5
21mths is`nt much for causing 29 deaths. I wonder what Fyfield and the company will get? That clown that drove up Snowdon got 22mths jail,where`s the comparison?
The exams and course are on line if you want to check them out... |
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Post by dazbt on Jan 18, 2013 14:11:02 GMT -5
21mths is`nt much for causing 29 deaths. I wonder what Fyfield and the company will get? That clown that drove up Snowdon got 22mths jail,where`s the comparison? No argument Jim "IF" the charges against him had been one of murder or manslaughter by neglect or otherwise, but I don't think he was charged or found guilty of causing any deaths, if I recall the charge against him was one of fraud or something similar. It may be that further more serious litigation is yet to come. I might well be wrong by the way ............ With regard to the Gleison tragedy the charges (or suggested charges) are of manslaughter by neglect a different kettle of fish. As to being imprisoned for driving up a mountain I make no comment  |
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Post by tygwyn on Jan 18, 2013 14:26:29 GMT -5
Thought i read in the report you linked up,that he told the men to alter the wiring on the CM that the warning would not come on,so they could continue working?
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Post by John on Jan 18, 2013 15:02:55 GMT -5
One of the charges against the company was defeating automatic methanometers on machines, the company was fined record fines for hundreds of violations of the mines act totaling millions of dollars.
I was once instructed to defeat the automatic methanometer on a longwall face in Australia... ;D Picked the wrong person to do that, I told the U/M in no uncertain terms if he sent me out the pit for refusing to carry out the order, I'd be straight on the phone to the Mine Manager, Electrical Engineer in Charge and the District Inspector of Mines.. He stormed off mumbling effing pommie bastard.... ;D
No I'm not perfect, I bent the rules if it was safe to do so, but would never bend that rule, cost me a days bonus, but I'm still alive to make this post as are the fellers who worked on that face with me..
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Post by dazbt on Jan 18, 2013 15:16:40 GMT -5
Thought i read in the report you linked up,that he told the men to alter the wiring on the CM that the warning would not come on,so they could continue working? He still wasn't charged with manslaughter Jim ........... and in some circumstances it wouldn't be illegal to run machinery without safety functions fully functional, at least in the USA, I've no idea about in Aus or anywhere else. I can't recall the exact details but in the US machines were allowed to run for a specified time with safety features such as methane monitoring (cut outs) being overridden with certain ongoing alternative manual monitoring taking place at designated intervals. |
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Post by John on Jan 18, 2013 15:58:33 GMT -5
Thought i read in the report you linked up,that he told the men to alter the wiring on the CM that the warning would not come on,so they could continue working? He still wasn't charged with manslaughter Jim ........... and in some circumstances it wouldn't be illegal to run machinery without safety functions fully functional, at least in the USA, I've no idea about in Aus or anywhere else. I can't recall the exact details but in the US machines were allowed to run for a specified time with safety features such as methane monitoring (cut outs) being overridden with certain ongoing alternative manual monitoring taking place at designated intervals.
In CM districts it was mandatory to have at least one spare miner cable and one spare shuttlecar cable. The district electrician had to sign that both were in a safe condition and in a safe place within the district noting the cable number too! If a cable was damaged it had to be changed, taping of a damaged sheath was forbidden.
The Act stated that a longwall face must have at least one methane monitor, which was usually mounted on the last shield canopy, operating that should the volume of methane attain 1.25% in the general body of the air, trip the face power automatically.
During one major stoppage of a face due to bad geology, the Mine Manager was on the face for many hours supervising bolting and meshing. I recall our Deputy asking him about the methane monitor, "if it fails, would I be in order getting John to disable it and monitor the face ventilation with my D6 and oil lamp"??
Manager said "firstly, how could you do you examinations fi you're tied to the tailgate monitoring the ventilation"?
Point well taken!!
He then said "It's a funny thing you brought this up, (I forget the time span now) but I was only asking the District Inspector about  week/days?? back the very same question, he shook his head, absolutely not! No methane monitor, no coal cutting, he said the Act required an automatic contrivance that would monitor the air and trip power should the methane reach 1.25%"
Had I not been there when Mr Potter had made that statement, I'd have gone along with bridging the detector out...
Another thing that came in with the new CMA in the 1980's was a ban on using Scotchcasts for temporary repairs to certain sections of trailing cable sheaths or armoured cables underground. Why??? I never found out as they were perfectly safe to use until production ceased for the day. The damage was sealed in epoxy... But they were forbidden by law.. Any damaged trailing cable had to be sent to surface to an approved workshop to be repaired in the appropriate manner as laid down by law.. Armoured cables to have either plugs attached or jointed with an approved joint box. |
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Post by dazbt on Jan 19, 2013 6:53:55 GMT -5
He still wasn't charged with manslaughter Jim ........... and in some circumstances it wouldn't be illegal to run machinery without safety functions fully functional, at least in the USA, I've no idea about in Aus or anywhere else. I can't recall the exact details but in the US machines were allowed to run for a specified time with safety features such as methane monitoring (cut outs) being overridden with certain ongoing alternative manual monitoring taking place at designated intervals.
In CM districts it was mandatory to have at least one spare miner cable and one spare shuttlecar cable. The district electrician had to sign that both were in a safe condition and in a safe place within the district noting the cable number too! If a cable was damaged it had to be changed, taping of a damaged sheath was forbidden.
The Act stated that a longwall face must have at least one methane monitor, which was usually mounted on the last shield canopy, operating that should the volume of methane attain 1.25% in the general body of the air, trip the face power automatically.
During one major stoppage of a face due to bad geology, the Mine Manager was on the face for many hours supervising bolting and meshing. I recall our Deputy asking him about the methane monitor, "if it fails, would I be in order getting John to disable it and monitor the face ventilation with my D6 and oil lamp"??
Manager said "firstly, how could you do you examinations fi you're tied to the tailgate monitoring the ventilation"?
Point well taken!!
He then said "It's a funny thing you brought this up, (I forget the time span now) but I was only asking the District Inspector about week/days?? back the very same question, he shook his head, absolutely not! No methane monitor, no coal cutting, he said the Act required an automatic contrivance that would monitor the air and trip power should the methane reach 1.25%"
Had I not been there when Mr Potter had made that statement, I'd have gone along with bridging the detector out...
Another thing that came in with the new CMA in the 1980's was a ban on using Scotchcasts for temporary repairs to certain sections of trailing cable sheaths or armoured cables underground. Why??? I never found out as they were perfectly safe to use until production ceased for the day. The damage was sealed in epoxy... But they were forbidden by law.. Any damaged trailing cable had to be sent to surface to an approved workshop to be repaired in the appropriate manner as laid down by law.. Armoured cables to have either plugs attached or jointed with an approved joint box.So if the face in Aus had been in compliance by having a methane monitor / trip fully functional at the face end, would you have been able to disable one (if it had been fitted) onboard the shearer ............... perhaps with the added security of ongoing hand held monitor use? I have a question about having a single methane monitor positioned on the gob-side tail-end of a face, to ask later, which could possibly be best answered by Eric or someone else experienced in methane dispersion. |
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Post by John on Jan 19, 2013 7:06:23 GMT -5
At that time we didn't have them on shearers or were they required Daz, just to monitor the general body of the air.
I don't recall any regulations in the "new CMRA" that even mentioned shearer mounted methane detection gear, so really cannot comment on any rules which have since been introduced since I left in 89.
The rules just specified a longwall face required on and where it was to be mounted, tested etc.
I can only use NSW as an example, as each state had it's own coal mine Acts, there were no Federal rules, Canberra left the states to govern themselves.
ie in Tasmania mine electricians had to have an electricians license, in NSW and Queensland they were required to have tech qualifications and mining training/experience to work alone and had to be authorised in writing by the Manager, much as we were used to from UK rules.
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Post by dazbt on Jan 19, 2013 7:56:21 GMT -5
By asking the hypothetical question J I was intending to suggest that when a longwall is in compliance with whatever ruling authority requires, then any further monitoring, such as on-board monitors could well be a great benefit but, that not having them funtional or being temporarily disabled as a result of them being faulty, perhaps does not put the face operation out of compliance.
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Post by dazbt on Jan 19, 2013 8:00:43 GMT -5
That’s the reason I mentioned Aus J, I well remember you relating that particular incident before. Taking that exact scenario into consideration, where a methane detection unit at the tailgate face end was the mandatory requirement, that regulation didn’t take account of the fact that serious ignitions of methane didn’t only occur within the general body at a point distant from the source of ignition, such as, for instance at the shearer pick point or for that matter at or on a continuous miner
“The Act stated that a longwall face must have at least one methane monitor, which was usually mounted on the last shield canopy, operating that should the volume of methane attain 1.25% in the general body of the air, trip the face power automatically”
I’m not at all knowledgeable about air flows and methane distribution and general dilution methods, but I do know this from practical experience of working on one particularly problematical Buttock Shearer face at Kiveton Park Colliery, the fact that methane levels monitored at the face-side could be vastly different to those measured on the gob-side, that applying not only to readings taken at the coal buttock (ie cutting drum at any point on the face), but also both the inbye and outbye side of the shearer. My point being that whilst the Statutory Requirement to measure methane in the general body was a correct thing to do, it couldn’t prevent an ignition at the point of most likely cause, the shearer pick. Relying on a monitor placed at the gob-side outbye end of a face might not have been the best place to monitor, but, and this is an important part, it did ensure compliance with the CMA and probably sufficed the M&Q Act.
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Post by John on Jan 19, 2013 8:25:26 GMT -5
If the machine had been required to have a methane detector, I would have been in contravention of NSW mine acts if I'd defeated it...I can't speak for all electricians Daz, but this one would never defeat a methane detector, I valued my life too much.
There was a case I was reading, there's also a mock up computerized video I believe on MSHA's site, where an outburst was ignited by the shearers picks which spread across to the goaf causing a rather loud bang... Problem was it killed the face team....
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Post by John on Jan 19, 2013 8:27:13 GMT -5
TBH, I don't think I'd last a shift down a coal mine in the US Daz....I'd be at odds with the mine bosses all the time over safety and regulations...
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Post by dazbt on Jan 19, 2013 17:19:32 GMT -5
If the machine had been required to have a methane detector, I would have been in contravention of NSW mine acts if I'd defeated it...I can't speak for all electricians Daz, but this one would never defeat a methane detector, I valued my life too much.
There was a case I was reading, there's also a mock up computerized video I believe on MSHA's site, where an outburst was ignited by the shearers picks which spread across to the goaf causing a rather loud bang... Problem was it killed the face team.... The UBB explosion was thought to have been initiated by sparks from a shearer cutting drum if I recall correctly, as is normally the case it was presumed to have been a methane ignition that developed into a massive coal dust explosion. Inadequately maintained PFF jets were mentioned. |
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boaz
Trainee
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Post by boaz on Jan 21, 2013 4:47:10 GMT -5
A few years ago I was looking at a project underground in an "ex Eastern Bloc" coal mine. The "fixed" CH4 detectors were all reading the same value, 0.3% CH4. When I told the manager that they were not working (on the basis that my portable detector was registering a different value and was changing values in different areas) he assured me they were calibrated and working. Can't say I believed him, Thus exit quickly
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Post by dazbt on Jan 21, 2013 6:09:16 GMT -5
Cost an old workmate of mine his life; “A methane explosion in the Ulyanovskaya Mine occurred in March 2007. Of the 203 individuals in the mine, 108 were killed and two went missing. The blast was presumably caused by a short circuit. Robertson, who inspected newly installed safety equipment as a special commission member, died in the explosion.” www.rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20120524/263254299.html “The worst so far happened three years ago at the nearby Ulyanovskaya mine, when a short circuit in newly-installed equipment triggered a massive blast that killed 108 people. Subsequent investigations found that mine operators had deliberately lowered the sensitivity of methane detectors inside the mine.” www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0509/Race-to-save-scores-trapped-after-Russia-coal-mine-disaster |
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Post by erichall on Jan 21, 2013 9:42:59 GMT -5
It's a long while since I worked underground, and then only in the UK, so I cannot comment on the 'foreign ' explosions. Since I worked u/g the Act as such has been modified. What I do remember, however, is a spate of what we termed as 'face flashes' which we had in the Threequarter Seam at Markham Colliery. Despite an excellent air flow through the face, we had a pyritic layer in the bottom of the coal seam, just in the area of the pre-cut jib on the DECMT. This is the area where ventilation is at its slowest and the dissipation of methane at its worst. Sparks arising from the picks striking the small fragments of pyrites were igniting the methane on occasions, and sometimes the methane along the whole face side would ignite. Along with members of Area Ventilation, and the HMI, a system of measuring using Methanometers was used to chart the actual sequence of events. Fortunately, or unfortunately in the scheme of investigation, the pyrites ran out. We did use methanometers, but not of the automatic type, but proved that the concentrations were occuring in a small space and the overall effect, though eye-catching and rather frightening, was rendered harmless due to the one thing I always considered an absolute essential - adequate ventilation!
It has been proved that a methane explosion on its own, whilst not desireable, is usually insufficient to cause serious explosions. The main fault is when the force is sufficient to stir up large amounts of coal dust, which will then simultaneously explode and cause chaos. This was the reason, though often forgotten or ignored, for the spreading of the dreaded Stonedust.
Demonstrations of this effect, and the difference in striking two pieces of rust steel together, compared with having one of the pieces layered with aluminium foil, were frequently displayed at what used to be the Mines Research Establishment (now the Health & Safety Executive Establishment at Harpur Hill, Buxton, close to where I now live.
One point to make, however, was that the only strictly legal decision was that of 'a cap on the lowered flame of a Deputy's Safety Lamp'. Perhaps the reason for this is that despite all the 'fancy gadgetry' which can fail, the fact that a specific percentage of Methane will burn above the lowered flame of a FSL. The only advice I would give to anyone, owner, manager, or workman is to make sure of adequate ventilation, oh and don't forget the stonedust.
One other point to make is that, whilst not excusing any Mine Official who puts output before safety, don't always assume it to be the official at fault. having worked on both sides of the fence,as it were, the workman will often find a quicker rather than a safer way. When I once escorted a Workmen's Inspector underground, he came across a system of flat trams with Wheway loadbinders affixed. As he examined them and asked what they were for. On being told that they bound the loads for transporting I asked him why.
'I'm trying to think of what they CAN be used for, not what they SHOULD be used for. Don't forget the miner is an adaptable animal' Sure enough, someone had lashed a chock to the AFC until it's hydraulic ram could be changed. Point made.
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Post by dazbt on Jan 21, 2013 13:00:22 GMT -5
Eric, please get the facts straight. (as you have said in the past  ) The DECMT didn't have a pre-cut jib. The rest of your description of the Markham 'flashes' pretty much resembles my observations of the Kiveton Park experiences, more on that later. (I'm just having my tea, but thought I might might take time to return a request you made to me once ;D ;D) |
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Post by erichall on Jan 22, 2013 13:47:37 GMT -5
Hi, Dazbt, point taken. I'm almost certain that the machine had a small trimming 'jib' at the floor simply to straighten the face, but I bow to your knowledge, knowing my mind is not what it was (age unfortunately) and that it is a long time since I worked u/g. However, I do remember the flashes, and it is more than likely that they are similar to the ones you experienced at K.P.
Probably the worst vision of this sort of thing came when we were cutting at Whitwell, where the seam had a high proportion of a very abrasive material in the top of the seam. The machine , I believe a shearer, but not sure, looked like a catherine wheel, and we were having to change picks every yard. Never known such wear. Whatever, when first seen it's a rather frightening experience
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Post by John on Jan 22, 2013 15:02:43 GMT -5
There were iron nodules in the Tupton seam at Clifton, the men nicknamed them "dogs bollocks" and iron pyrite layers in the Deep Hard seam, both caused a lot of "Catherine wheels" when the shearer was cutting through them, thank God we didn't have gas problems, I never once saw any flares.
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rob52
Shotfirer.
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Post by rob52 on Jun 14, 2013 8:34:17 GMT -5
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Post by John on Jun 14, 2013 12:22:06 GMT -5
I haven't finished reading the report yet, but two things scare the crap out of me, burning and welding in a gaseous mine, even more so right at the actual working face....
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rob52
Shotfirer.
Posts: 199
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Post by rob52 on Nov 15, 2014 23:31:44 GMT -5
Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship indictedThursday, November 13, 2014 Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship indicted Massesy CEO Court Docs Further DetailDon Blankenship, the longtime chief executive officer of Massey Energy, was indicted Thursday on charges that he orchestrated the routine violation of key federal mine safety rules at the company’s Upper Big Branch Mine prior to an April 2010 explosion that killed 29 miners. A federal grand jury in Charleston charged Blankenship with conspiring to cause willful violations of ventilation requirements and coal-dust control rules — meant to prevent deadly mine blasts —during a 15-month period prior to the worst coal-mining disaster in a generation. The four-count indictment, filed in U.S. District Court, also alleges that Blankenship led a conspiracy to cover up mine safety violations and hinder federal enforcement efforts by providing advance warning of government inspections. “Blankenship knew that UBB was committing hundreds of safety-law violations every year and that he had the ability to prevent most of the violations that UBB was committing,” the indictment states. “Yet he fostered and participated in an understanding that perpetuated UBB’s practice of routine safety violations, in order to produce more coal, avoid the costs of following safety laws, and make more money.” The indictment also alleges that, after the explosion, Blankenship made false statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public about Massey’s safety practices before the explosion. *************** The Law Works Special - The Upper Big Branch Coal Mine Investigation Uploaded on May 25, 2011 On April 5, 2010, twenty-nine coal miners died in the explosion of the Upper Big Branch Mine, the worst United States coal mine accident in nearly forty years. As a result, then Governor Joe Manchin asked the former head of the Mine Safety and Heath Administration, Davitt McAteer, to conduct an independent investigation. Joe Manchin caused it. McAteer's report calls to end the "cozy relationship" between high gov. officials and coal operators. stating: “It is only in the context of a culture bent on production at the expense of safety that these obvious deviations from decades of known safety practices makes sense.“ he condemns the state of WV's unwillingness to protect miners, calling it “a political failure – a failure by the state’s government to nurture and support strict safety standards for coal miners!" www.wju.eduElectronic Copy of Report Available here Upper Big Branch The April 5 2010 explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practicesJ Davitt McAteer - Ex Head of MSHA Frank assessment tell it like it was/is Tell us how could it happen
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Post by John on Nov 16, 2014 7:15:27 GMT -5
Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship indictedThursday, November 13, 2014 Longtime Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship indicted Massesy CEO Court Docs Further DetailDon Blankenship, the longtime chief executive officer of Massey Energy, was indicted Thursday on charges that he orchestrated the routine violation of key federal mine safety rules at the company’s Upper Big Branch Mine prior to an April 2010 explosion that killed 29 miners. A federal grand jury in Charleston charged Blankenship with conspiring to cause willful violations of ventilation requirements and coal-dust control rules — meant to prevent deadly mine blasts —during a 15-month period prior to the worst coal-mining disaster in a generation. The four-count indictment, filed in U.S. District Court, also alleges that Blankenship led a conspiracy to cover up mine safety violations and hinder federal enforcement efforts by providing advance warning of government inspections. “Blankenship knew that UBB was committing hundreds of safety-law violations every year and that he had the ability to prevent most of the violations that UBB was committing,” the indictment states. “Yet he fostered and participated in an understanding that perpetuated UBB’s practice of routine safety violations, in order to produce more coal, avoid the costs of following safety laws, and make more money.” The indictment also alleges that, after the explosion, Blankenship made false statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public about Massey’s safety practices before the explosion. *************** The Law Works Special - The Upper Big Branch Coal Mine Investigation About time justice is being served, lets hope after he's prosecuted, a clear message will be sent to mine owners. Uploaded on May 25, 2011 On April 5, 2010, twenty-nine coal miners died in the explosion of the Upper Big Branch Mine, the worst United States coal mine accident in nearly forty years. As a result, then Governor Joe Manchin asked the former head of the Mine Safety and Heath Administration, Davitt McAteer, to conduct an independent investigation. Joe Manchin caused it. McAteer's report calls to end the "cozy relationship" between high gov. officials and coal operators. stating: “It is only in the context of a culture bent on production at the expense of safety that these obvious deviations from decades of known safety practices makes sense.“ he condemns the state of WV's unwillingness to protect miners, calling it “a political failure – a failure by the state’s government to nurture and support strict safety standards for coal miners!" www.wju.eduElectronic Copy of Report Available here Upper Big Branch The April 5 2010 explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practicesJ Davitt McAteer - Ex Head of MSHA Frank assessment tell it like it was/is Tell us how could it happen |
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rob52
Shotfirer.
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Post by rob52 on Nov 21, 2014 3:02:15 GMT -5
Massey Energy Disappears into Alpha Natural ResourcesAlpha Natural Resources =>> Massey Energy Disappears into another corporate structure with all the political fanfare and back slapping…disgusting. It is so important to hold directors and board accountable. 14,000 people employed Largest Coal Exporter from USA Worlds 3rd Largest exporter of Metallurgical Coal Who Alpha hires is their responsibility it is a private company.... =>> Really....corporate accountability and payment of compensation....yeah right Self Funded words of a Weasel...Upper Big Branch - Never Again **Don Blackenship deflecting his ownership of responsibility** Self Funded alternate theory that a Natural Gas Inundation was to blame and that it was beyond the control of Massey Energy and that MSHA regulations and MSHA compliant Ventilation implementation created the conditions that lead to the explosion. Conveniently forgets to mention that... "Pumps failed over the long weekend. Water build up restricted/blocked the ventilation, hence likely that a significant CH4 build had occurred in the GOB. The 1 North Longwall was almost completed thus the Gob/Goaf was of considerable size therefore significant ability to create a storage reservoir for CH4. Did the pump lower the water level sufficient to release a significant CH4 volume. "& "Many of those who died were young eg 21yrs old, and had little experience underground and therefore limited exposure to underground mining and in a number of cases the only place they had worked was UBB! therefore the only source for the black lung contributing respiritatible dust was UBB was UBB!!"& "Ground up limestone lowers the explosive rate of the coal dust. Failure to keep rock dust in place is a fundamental failure in basic safety precautions.
220 miners interviewed. Insufficient air coming into the mine. Very hot underground on a daily basis. Changes made by the foreman of the sections on an adhoc basis. The ventilation system was not providing sufficient diluting capability."& "The water sprays on the shearer Drum were not functional thus all that came out was a dribble" Meeehh!! =>> To Jail for the Weasel! Rob
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week/days?? back the very same question, he shook his head, absolutely not! No methane monitor, no coal cutting, he said the Act required an automatic contrivance that would monitor the air and trip power should the methane reach 1.25%"
) The DECMT didn't have a pre-cut jib.